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THE THIRD DEGREE
A GREAT deal has been written and said recently aboutthe third degree. The "third degree" is that miscon-
duct or brutality, or both, used by the police in an effort to
extort from a person arrested for crime a confession of his
guilt. Such misconduct or brutality is especially reprehen-
sible because the person mistreated is in the power of the
police. An admission of guilt so obtained is of no value to
the prosecution.' Testimony of such misconduct or brutal-
ity, though untrue, often has resulted in the acquittal of
persons who were known to be guilty.
During my terms as District Attorney of New York
County, I heard much of the third degree. A peculiar fact is
that it is more talked about than practiced. At least, that
was my experience. Whether that is the condition that ex-
ists now or not, I cannot say; but I presume that with the
same police force which was functioning during the period
that I was District Attorney, the conditions are about the
same as they were then. But whether it is practiced seldom
or often is of little consequence. One case of police brutality
is one too many. Anyway, the average person believes it is
practiced, and something should be done to correct that com-
mon impression.
If the subject were not so serious, it would be amusing
to read and hear what is said about it. One suggestion re-
cently was that there should be legislation to compel the
police to take the person arrested immediately before the
magistrate. It has been overlooked by those who have writ-
ten and talked about the subject, that there now exist laws
against detaining a defendant beyond an unnecessary time
before he is taken before the magistrate. But it is one of the
defects of government that even intelligent persons are not
conversant with the provisions of laws enacted for the bene-
fit of the people.
In that chapter of the Code of Criminal Procedure which
relates to the warrant of arrest, it is provided in Section 165
as follows:
1 Code of Criminal Procedure §395; People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 159
N. E. 379 (1927); People v. Weiner, 248 N. Y. 118, 161 N. E. 441 (1928);
People v. Barbato, 254 N. Y. 170, 172 N. E. 458 (1930).
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"The defendant must in all cases be taken before the
magistrate without unnecessary delay, and he may
give bail at any hour of the day or night."
The arresting officer who fails to take a prisoner before
a magistrate without unnecessary delay becomes a trespasser
ab initio, and is liable to an action for damages for false
imprisonment.2
The legislature decided long ago that this civil liability
would not be sufficient to compel the arresting officer to
carry out the mandate of the statute, and Section 1844 of the
Penal Law (which, by the way, was derived from Section
118 of the old Penal Code) was enacted as follows:
"A public officer or other person having arrested any
person upon a criminal charge, who wilfully and
wrongfully delays to take such person before a magis-
trate having jurisdiction to take his examination, is
guilty of a misdemeanor."
It seems that these provisions of the law meet the de-
mand for legislation to the extent of requiring an immediate
arraignment.
Since the enactment of some of the so-called Baumes
Laws, it has become necessary for the arresting officer first
to take his prisoner to a place fixed by the regulations of the
Police Department to have the accused fingerprinted.3 This
is to enable the magistrate to act upon the defendant's appli-
cation for bail. Such action on the part of the police officer
would not be regarded as "unnecessary. delay" but any action
beyond that might be so regarded.
Of course, an arrest may be made after adjournment,
even, of the night court, but the prisoner should be taken
before the magistrate at the next opening of court.
In the Magistrates Courts, the defendant's rights are
safeguarded. The magistrate must immediately inform the
defendant of the charge against him, and of his right to the
"'Poster v. Began, 9 Misc. 547, 30 N. Y. Supp. 657 (1894); Davis v.
Carroll, 172 App. Div. 729, 159 N. Y. Supp. 568 (4th Dept. 1916).
' Code of Criminal Procedure §552a.
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aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings, and before
further proceedings are had.' The magistrate must also
allow the defendant a reasonable time to send for counsel
and adjourn the examination for that purpose. Upon the
request of defendant, the magistrate must require a peace
officer to take a message to such counsel as the defendant
may name. The officer must without delay and without fee
perform that duty.5
On appearance of counsel, or after waiting a reasonable
time for him, the examination must proceed immediately,
unless the defendant waives examination and elects to give
bail.6 The examination must be completed at one session
unless the magistrate, for good cause shown, adjourns it, in
which event the adjournment cannot be for more than two
days at each time, unless by consent or on motion of the
defendant.7 At the examination, the magistrate must, in the
first place, read to the defendant the depositions of the wit-
nesses examined on the taking of the information, and, if the
defendant requests it, or elects to have the examination, the
magistrate must summon for cross-examination the witnesses
so examined, if they be in the county. He must also issue
subpoenas for additional witnesses on the request of the defen-
dant or the prosecutor. 8
The witnesses must be examined in the presence of the
defendant and may be cross-examined in his behalf.9
When the examination of the witnesses on the part of
the people is closed, the magistrate must inform the defen-
dant that it is his right to make a statement in relation to the
charge against him, stating to the defendant the nature of the
charge; that the statement is designed to enable him, if he
see fit, to answer the charge and to explain the facts alleged
against him; that he is at liberty to waive making a state-
ment and that his waiver cannot be used against him on
the trial.' 0
'Ibid. §188.
Ibid. §189.0 Ibid. §190.I1bid. §191.
a Ibid. §194.
9 Ibid. §195.
10 Ibid. §§196, 197.
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The Code of Criminal Procedure then provides in detail
for the making of the statement, questions to be propounded,
the manner of reducing it to writing, the reading to the
defendant of the questions propounded to him, and the right
of the defendant to make such corrections to his answers,
until his statement is made conformable to what he declares
to be the truth; the certification by the magistrate; the exclu-
sion of witnesses during the hearing; the employment of a
stenographer, and the methods of keeping and returning the
depositions and other papers. 1
If the defendant is held and the case is one in which the
law permits bail to be given, he may give bail and the magis-
trate fixes the amount of the bail to be required.' 2
So far, the law provides for the complete protection of
the defendant when he is in court. The reason that a state-
ment or confession of a defendant is sought out of court pos-
sibly grows out of the provision in Section 196 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure that the defendant need not answer
questions propounded to him and that his waiver cannot be
used against him on the trial.
This is the provision in the present procedure which
should be changed in order to protect the one accused of
crime against efforts on the part of the police and others to
extort from him a confession, if for no other reason.
The law should provide that the defendant should be
questioned before the magistrate, and before no one else, as
to his connection with the crime of which he is accused; and
should provide severe penalties for a violation of such a law;
and further provide that an admission or confession made to
the police, or any other official, by one accused of crime at
any place other than in the presence of a magistrate, should
not be used against the person so accused.
To make such provision of the law effective, it also must
provide that the defendant should be compelled to answer the
questions propounded to him in the presence of the magis-
trate, or be informed that his failure to make answers might
be a fact which could be introduced against him on the trial
of the criminal action which may follow. Such a provision
Ibid. §§198-209.
Ibid. §210.
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would require amendment of the present law and of the Con-
stitution. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution of the
State of New York provides that no one shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. In the
same section, it is provided that no person shall be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
presentment or indictment of a grand jury. Our Court of
Appeals has held that the defendant cannot waive this con-
stitutional right as regards indictment.13
So it seems that it would be necessary to amend Article
1, Section 6 of the State Constitution to the extent of provid-
ing that, on the failure or refusal of the defendant to testify
in his own behalf, or to make explanation according to the
provisions of the above-quoted sections of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, such failure or refusal might be introduced in
evidence against him on the trial of the criminal action which
may follow his being held by the magistrate.
These provisions would protect the person accused of
crime against any violence, against any statements or confes-
sions extorted from him in any way, and would guarantee
that the statements that he might make to the magistrate
would be the statements that he wished to make. The defen-
dant frequently will not make a statement to the police, or
even to the District Attorney, for fear that his statement will
not be taken accurately; that only the parts which tend to
implicate him will be taken and matters of defense will be
omitted. But, under the protection of the court, a defen-
dant, knowing that he must make a statement or else that
fact will be brought against him later, will make a statement
regarding his implication in the crime or his exoneration of
the charge. We know that an innocent person will not refuse
to make a statement under such circumstances. The guilty
will probably remain silent.
While we are making changes, those sections of the Code
of Criminal Procedure relating to the examination should
be amended to the extent that, in all felony actions, the testi-
mony of the witnesses accusing the defendant must be taken
by the magistrate in the presence of the defendant, giving the
defendant the right to cross-examine; and such testimony
" People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E. 111 (1928).
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should be taken stenographically and perpetuated for the
use of either the defendant or the District Attorney in the
subsequent trial of the action. This would protect both the
people and the defendant against absconding witnesses.
Then, on the trial, provision should be made that the testi-
mony so given by witnesses either before the magistrate,
before the grand jury, or in the presence of a representative
of the District Attorney when such testimony is taken steno-
graphically, might be read in evidence, in case a witness on
the trial attempted to change his testimony; and that the
jury should be permitted to determine whether the witness
testified falsely on previous hearings or is testifying falsely
at the trial.
It will take some time to have the State Constitution
amended, assuming that the legislature will be willing to pro-
pose amendments. It will take some time to have the statutes
amended to carry into effect the State Constitutional amend-
ment or to carry into effect suggestions similar to those I have
made above. In the meantime something should be done to
protect those accused of crime and to correct the common
impression regarding police brutality.
The district attorneys of the state can be of great help
in this regard.
During my administration of the office of the District
Attorney, every prisoner was apprised of the fact that, if he
claimed he had been mistreated by the police, he could apply
to the District Attorney and, in the presence of his physician
and his lawyer, and of the medical assistant to the District
Attorney, accurate photographs would be made of any part
of his body which he claimed showed that violence had been
practiced against him.
The District Attorney of New York County maintains
an up-to-date photographic studio in charge of a skilled
photographer, and accurate photographs will be taken of
any part of the body of a defendant who claims that he has
been beaten or mistreated. No doubt other district attorneys
who have not this modern equipment in their offices would
arrange for some photographer to take such pictures. Every
district attorney has a contingent fund at his disposal out of
which he can pay the expenses of taking such photographs.
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I remember only two cases, during my administration
as District Attorney, in which a person accused of crime
availed himself of the offer of the District Attorney, although
I know that in about twenty per cent. of the cases brought
to trial, the defendant's lawyer made a great noise about the
brutality of the police. It is one of the pet tricks of lawyers
for the defendant to put the police on trial, rather than the
accused.
Then, too, the public should realize the difference be-
tween the use of force by the police in making an arrest of
a dangerous criminal, or one seeking to escape or resist
arrest, and the use of force at the station house or at head-
quarters, against one who is utterly in the power of the
police. No one should blame the police for protecting them-
selves against dangerous criminals or from using proper
force to prevent an escape. No one could approve the action
of the police in the use of force against, or any other mis-
treatment of, a person in their custody at the station house
or headquarters.
The real purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure is
to secure an accurate administration of the Penal Law. It is
as necessary that the rights of the innocent be protected as
that the guilty should be convicted. It is absolutely neces-
sary that a person arrested be protected against any form
of brutality. If for no other reason than this, it seems that
the Legislature of this State should act speedily in this
matter.
JOAB H. BANTON.
New York City, N. Y.
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